EDITORIAL by unknown
YALE LAW JOURNAL
S lSMrIPON PRICE, $.A A YEAR. $INUX COPIE, 31 CENTS.
BDITORIAL BOARD.
CHARLES E. HART, JR., Chairman.
FRANx KENNA, Graduate, THOMAS C. MALLEY,
Business Manager. Secretary.
JAmEs D. BAIRD. S. BEEKMAN LAUB,
HowA w F. BIsHop, THOMAS A. TEACHER,
WILLIAM E. COLLINS, C. KENNETH WYNNE,
ARTHUR M. COMLEY, EARNEST A. INGLIS,
CLARENCE R. HALL, Roy A. LINN,
ELDON L. HILDrrcH, HowARD N. ROGERS.
Published monthly during the Academic year, by students of the Yale Law School.
P.O. Address, Box 893, Yale Station, New Haven, Conn.
If a subscriber wishes his copy of the JOURNAL discontinued at the expiration of
his subscription, notice-to that effect should be sent; otherwise, it is assumed that a
continuation of the subscription is desired.
INJUNCTIONS TO RESTRAIN DIVORCE ACTIONS. IN OTHER STATES.
The New Jersey courts in the recent case of Von Bernuth v.
Von Bernuth, 73 Alt., xo49, has again held that an injunction
will issue on motion of petitioner for divorce to restrain defend-
ant from prosecuting an action for separation in New York.
The petitioner filed her petition for a divorce in the New Jersey
court against the defendant. The defendant was then residing in
New York, but by appearance through counsel, the court acquired
jurisdiction over him. Finally he filed a cross petition for an
absolute divorce against the petitioner. Prior to this last pro-
ceeding the defendant brought -an action for separation in the
New York courts against the petitioner on the same grounds.
Petitioner applied to the New Jersey court for an injunction
restraining the defendant from prosecuting the New York action
because, (I) the New Jersey courts having first obtained juris-
diction of the parties were entitled to a determination of the issue,
and (2) the New York action was vexatious to the petitioner.
Could the court of New Jersey enjoin the defendant from
proseduting the action in New York? The petitioner, if the in-
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junction did not issue would have been compelled to defend two
suits for substantially the same cause of action--desertion.
The doubt which early existed as to the power of English
Chancery courts to grant injunctions restraining those over
whom the courts had jurisdiction from doing, or compelling them
by specific performance, to do certain acts in foreign jurisdic-
tions has long since been removed. In Penn v. Lord Baltimore,
i Ves. Sen., 444, specific performance of an agreement con-
cerning the boundary of a North American province was de-
creed. The equitable maxim, Aequitas agit in personam, was the
basis of the court's decision.
The case of Lord Portarlington v. Soulby, 3 M. & K., 104, de-
cided in 1834, outlined the English rule so clearly that there is no
doubt as to the power of those courts in proper cases to restrain
an individual from prosecuting an action in a foreign court. This
was a motion to restrain the defendant from suing in Ireland. It
was contended that the English courts could not so interfere with
the Irish courts. But the opinion of the court did not rest on
such a ground. Courts had compelled parties within their juris-
diction to convey property situated abroad, to bring home goods
from abroad. Why not forbid one from performing certain acts
abroad?
Treatises on injunctions agree that courts may exercise this
power. Story's Equity Jurisprudence, Sect. 899, says: "But al-
though the courts of another, they have undoubted authority to
control all persons and things within their own territorial limits.
When, therefore, both parties to a suit in a foreign country are
resident within the territorial limits of another country, the
courts of equity in the latter may act in personam upon these
parties and direct them, by injunction, to proceed no further in
such suits."
The Amer. & Eng. Ency. of Law, Vol. X, p. 9o8, states that by
a clear weight of authority in England and America, equity, hav-
ing jurisdiction of the parties, will enjoin them from instituting
actions in other states and countries, where the facts justify it.
22 Cyc. 813, states the rule in substantially the same manner.
See also Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. III, p. 395, note i.
Some English decisions hold contrary to the above doctrine.
The court In re Boyse, T5 Ch. Div., 591, refused to restrain a
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foreign creditor from proceeding in a foreign court against an
administrator, holding that it had no authority to interfere with
a foreign creditor, resident abroad, for suing in the courts of his
own country.
In Moor v. Anglo-Italian Bank, io Ch. Div., 68i, the court re-
fused to grant an injunction against an encumbrancer on im-
movable property situated in a foreign country, who had instituted
legal proceedings in that country for the purpose of enforcing
his rights.
In In re Chapman, 15 Eq. 75, the court refused to restrain
foreign creditors from continuing actions brought in X4ew York
courts, although a receiver to the debtor had been appointed.
There are some decisions in this country contrary to this policy.
Carroll v. Farmers & Mechanics Bk., Harring (Mich.) 197, re-
fused to follow this rule on the ground that if one state granted
such an injunction the other might retaliate in like manner. This
position cannot be maintained. The injunction is not directed
against the foreign court, but to the parties to the suit.
In Williams v. Ayrault, 31 Bar., 364, an injunction was re-
fused because the action in the court of a sister state had been
commenced and was pending.
The most frequently cited decision adverse to the majority doc-
trine is Mead v. Merritt, 2 Paige 402. The court would not
restrain proceedings which had been previously commenced in
the courts of another state because of the danger of retaliatory
measures being resorted to by the other state.
As to whether our courts recognize this doctrine, perhaps it
would suffice to refer to the leading case of Cole v. Cunningham,
133 U. S. io7, where Fuller, C. J., rendering the opinion con-
ceded this power to courts of equity of the different states. It
was contended that the doctrine contravened the "full faith and
credit" clause of the United States Constitution, but the conten-
tion was overruled on the ground that if equity courts of one
state, in accordance with the established rules of equity, could con-
trol persons within their jurisdiction from the prosecution of
suits in another, the Constitution could not be said to prescribe
any different rule.
In Massie v. Watts, 6 Ch., 148, Marshall, C. J., said: "The
court is of the opinion that in a case of fraud or trust, or of con-
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tract, the jurisdiction of a court of chancery is sustainable wher-
ever the person can be found, although lands not within the juris-
diction of that court may be affected by the decree."
The rule as laid down in Williams v. Ayrault, supra, was later,
in Vail v. Knapp, 49 Bar., 299, overruled, where it was held that
although an action had been commenced in a foreign court, the
courts in a proper case, to prevent oppression or fraud, should
act. No rule of comity forbade it. This doctrine was followed
in Claflin & Co. v. Hamlin, 62 How. Prac. (N. Y.), 284; in
Allegany & K. R. Co. v. Weidenfeld et al., 25 N. Y. Supp. 71;
and in Dehon v. Foster, 4 Allen, 545.
Harris v. Pullman, 84 Ill. 2o, held that it was inconsistent with
interstate harmony to attempt to control by injunction suits
already commenced in another state, but New York and Massa-
chusetts courts say that "extreme delicacy" should not deter the
court from acting in proper cases. In all such actions the com-
plainant must show that the suit sought to be restrained is brought
in bad faith, or for the purpose of vexing the party seeking the
injunction.
Such an injunction has issued to restrain divorce proceedings
in the following cases:
In Forest v. Forest, 2 Edm. Sel. Cas. (N. Y.), i8o, where both
parties resided in New York and one of them attempted to carry
on divorce proceedings in another state. In Kittle v. Kittle, 8
Daly (N. Y.) 72, where defendant of an action pending in New
York commenced an action in Connecticut, intending to bring it
to trial there, before the wife could go to trial in New York-
she being unable to defend in Connecticut because of her lack of
funds. In Kempson v. Kempson, 58 N. J. E. 94, and in Huettin-
ger v. Huettinger, (N. J. Ch.) 43 Alt. 574, both being cases where
mere prentended domiciles were alleged for the purpose of sup-
porting the suits.
In Dehon v. Foster, supra, the court in restraining a Massachu-
setts citizen from attaching property in Pennsylvania as against
a Massachusetts debtor so as to prevent it from coming into the
hands of the assignee appointed by the Massachusetts court, says,
through Bigelow, C. J.: "An act which is unlawful and con-
trary to equity gains no sanction or validity by the mere form or
manner in which it is done. It is none the less a violation of our
COMMENTS
laws because it is effected through the instrumentality of a pro-
cess which is lawful in a foreign tribunal. By interposing to
prevent it, we do not interfere with the jurisdiction of courts in
other states, or control the operation of foreign laws. We only
assert and enforce our own authority over persons within our
jurisdiction to prevent them from making use of means by which
they seek to countervail and escape the operation of our own
laws, in derogation of the rights and to the wrong and injury of
our own citizens."
DIUGENCE AND PRUDENCE AS AN ELEMENT OF GOOD FAITH.
By its decision in the case of First National Bank of Birming-
ham, Alabama v. Gilbert & Clay, 49 So. Rep., 513, the Supreme
Court of the State of Louisiana accepts and adopts a common
law doctrine as laid down by an Illinois court which seems to
be too broad and too general a statement to stand as the accepted
rule of law.
The question involved the payment of money by an authorized
agent and the measure of caution called for by the party to whom
it was paid. As the transaction took place in one state, though
one party lived in and the action arose in another state, the law
of the former state was applicable.
One Chisholm, a teller in the plaintiff bank, entered into a
series of speculations with the defendant partnership, holding
himself out to be the agent of an undisclosed principal who desired
to keep out of the transactions. In the course of the specula-
tions, Chisholm paid over, in various sums, the amount of $ioo,-
ooo.oo. These amounts he paid while on duty as teller and
through checks of his supposed principal which he handled in
the ordinary course of business. The defendants, after dealing
with Chisholm for some time, demanded to know his principal
and upon his refusal to disclose him, closed out his account. At
no time during the transactions did they make any effort to find
out his authority as agent, or to assure themselves of the re-
lations between Chisholm and his reputed principal. The money
paid out was that of the plaintiff bank which alleges that the
defendants, from the facts and conditions of the case, should
have known that the undisclosed principal was a fictitious party
and that Chisholm had been speculating for himself with the
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funds of the bank. The bank sued, alleging that the facts of the
case should have put the defendants on notice to inquire into
Chisholm's authority and that failure to do so, under all the cir-
cumstances, was unexcusable and the partnership was therefore
bound to refund the money. The Supreme Court of Louisiana, in
affirming the decision of the lower court, adopted in toto the text of
the Illinois case of Merchants Loan & Trust Co. v. Lawson, 90
Ill. Ap., 18, and held that money transferred to an honest taker
and received in the due course of business and without knowledge
of the felony, is held by good title against the one from whom it
is stolen and that bad faith alone will defeat the right of the
taker: "Mere ground of suspicion or knowledge of the circum-
stances which would create suspicion in the mind of a prudent
man or gross negligence on the part of the taker will not defeat
his title. Bad faith alone will not; the test is honesty and good
faith, not diligence."
It is submitted that this view is one which is too broad and
which extends the common law doctrine to such a limit that if ac-
cepted, it would increase the risk in ordinary business transactions
and lower business morality in the interests of a doubtful com-
mercial expediency. No rules of agency, no tests of good faith
and no established lines of decisions can sustain this view as
adopted by the Louisiana courts.
It is an accepted principle of law and of morals, that wilful
ignorance is equivalent to actual knowledge and he who ab-
stains from inquiry when inquiry ought to be made cannot be
heard to say so and rely upon his ignorance. Mackey v. Fuller-
ton, 7 Colo. 556; Whitebread v. Boulroes, i You. Coll. Ex-Re-
portr 303. And surely one who deals with an agent whose acts or
supposed authority imply a doubt to that authority, is put to
inquiry and discovery at his peril. 31 Cyc. 1322, says: "Every
person therefore who undertakes to deal with an alleged agent is
put upon inquiry and must discover at his peril that such pre-
tended agent has authority and that it is in its nature and extent
sufficient to permit him to do the proposed act and that its sources
can be traced to the will of the alleged principal." The decisions
make this even stronger, holding that anything that arouses a
suspicion obligates an inquiry and the law presumes that what-
ever the inquiry would disclose, is known. See Rochester & C.
T. Ry. Co. v. Paviour, 164 N. Y., 281; Hennebery v. Moise, 56
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Ill., 394; Hamlin v. Pettibone, Fed. Cas. No. 5, 595; Williamson
v. Brown, 15 N. Y. App. Cas., 354. Also see Anderson v. Kissam,
35 Fed. Rep., 799, which said: "When the transaction is such
as should arouse suspicion of the agent's authority to represent
his principal, it is the duty of those who deal with him in a repre-
sentative character to apply to his principal for information."
Should the facts here have aroused suspicion in the minds of
the defendants? Were they such that it were incumbent upon
the defendants to use diligence and make bona tide efforts to
ascertain whether Chisholm had the proper authority to pay over
such funds for his undisclosed principal, or were the defendants
justified in receiving the money in silence and because there was
no actual bad faith assume there was no need to make any active
inquiry?
It can hardly be doubted that the rule as laid down in the case
under discussion is insufficient. Chisholm held himself out to be
the agent of his undisclosed principal to carry out these specula-
tions. He offered no proof of his agency. It cannot be disputed
that there is no more settled rule in law that that relations of
agency cannot be proved by the mere declarations of the party
claiming to be an agent where the fact of agency is at issue. This
has been unanimously held. See Hullanphy Savings Bank v.
Schott, 135 Ill. 655; Salmon Falls Bank v, Leyser, 116 Mo. 51;
Proctor v. Tows, 115 Ill. 138; Marvin v. Wilbur, 52 N. Y. 27o;
Gifford v. Landrine, 37 N. J. Eq. 127; also see Meechem on
Agency, Sect. 7o. This fact alone, the uncorroborated statement
of Chisholm of his authority as agent, should have warned the
defendants of the necessity of making further inquiry and of
ascertaining the extent of his authority.
Did Chisholm, by paying the amounts lost in the speculation
during his business hours as paying teller and by making
such payments over his teller's window, disarm any suspicion on
the part of Gilbert and Clay? Hoer v. Miller, 75 Pac. (Kans.)
76, says: "The fact that the cashier is personally interested in
such a transaction is sufficient to put his creditor upon inquiry as
to the actual extent of his, the cashier's authority." If Chisholm
made these payments during his business hours but as a private
individual and not as a cashier, which fact is claimed by the de-
fendants, the fact that he was interested in them personally again
put the defendants upon inquiry. Suppose these payments were
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made, as claimed, on what were thought to be bona fde checks
and paid out by the teller in the scope of his duty as such. He
was then acting in two capacities, as agent for the bank and for
his undisclosed principal, and this fact once more put the de-
fendant on notice. "Upon the proof that the transaction was
known to the claimant to be an individual one and not with the
bank, the burden is cast upon the claimant to establish that the
act of the cashier thus done for his own individual benefit was
authorized or ratified. The test of the transaction is whether it
is done with the bank- and its business or with the cashier and
in his business." Campbell v. Manufacturer's National Bank, 5i
Atl., 497; Moore v. Bank, III U. S., 156; Rochester & Charlotte
Turnpike Ry Co. v. Paviour, supra; Williams v. Dorr, 135
Pa. St. 445. Also "By putting an officer at the window to do
its business, a bank publishes to the world that he is there to do
its business and not his business, that he has no power or au-
thority to do any act outside the legitimate prosecution of the cor-
porate enterprise." Hier v. Miller, 75 Pac. Rep., 76. From the
opinions of the above cited cases, it is apparent that the payments
by the teller should not have been taken as private acts. Even
considered private acts, in the light of all the facts known to the
defendant, the acts constituted notice that the defendants were
apparently accepting money from one to whom it did not belong.
This would cast upon the deferidants the duty of inquiring into
the matter far enough to see whether the facts were in accord
with the appearances. If they were not, then they knew they
could not honestly take the checks paid to them by Chisholm.
It cannot be doubted that in view of all the facts and the
rulings applicable to them, the defendants had numerous and
forcible suspicions that Chisholm was acting under a doubtful
authority and any consistency with good faith and honesty de-
manded an inquiry into his authority.
It cannot be believed that the law as laid down by the Illinois
court and in this case adopted by the Louisiana court is the true
and accepted doctrine which is consistent with principles of fair-
ness, law or morality. A nearer and more just rule is that which
is laid down by Rochester v. Paviour, supra, and adopted by the
weight of authority with a few isolated exceptions and which is
the fairer and broader doctrine, i. e., that one who suspects or
ought to suspect, is bound to inquire, and the law presumes that
he knows whatever inquiry would disclose. Good faith alone is
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not enough; good faith and honesty demand diligence and care
and this combination is necessary, under the circumstances of this
case, to put the defendants in the position of a bona fide holder
with good title as against the one from whom it was stolen.
ACTION AGAINST STATE OFFICERS AN ACTION AGAINST THE STATE.
On January 14, 19o9, the Arkansas Brick & Manufacturing
Company, a corporation, instituted suit in the Pulaski Chancery
Court against appellants, J. A. Pitcock, superintendent of the
Arkansas State Penitentiary and the Governor of the State, Sec-
retary of State, Attorney-general, Auditor of State, and State
Commissioner of Mines and Agriculture, composing the Board
of Commissioners of the Arkansas State Penitentiary, to restrain
them from violating an alleged contract which had been entered
into between them and the plaintiff for the furnishing to the
latter of the labor of state convicts.
The prayer of the complaint was, that a temporary restraining
order be made, restraining the defendants, and each of them,
from taking any action looking to the withdrawal of the con-
victs, and requiring said Board of Penitentiary Commissioners
to carry out the terms of the agreement; that upon final hearing
a decree be entered as above prayed, and that said order of the
board directing the superintendent to take away from plaintiff
the convicts, and refusing to carry out its agreement be declared
null and void.
It is alleged also, that the contract, as amended, which has
been the subject of litigation in the case of McConnell v. Arkan-
sas Brick & Manufacturing Co., supra, has been adjudged by the
Pulaski Chancery Court and by the Supreme Court, on appeal,
to be valid.
Upon filing the complaint, a temporary restraining injunction
was issued and actual notice of such injunction conveyed to the
appellant, Pitcock, but he acted in compliance with the resolutions
of the Board of Penitentiary Commissioners, regardless of notice
of issuance of the injunction. The question came to the Supreme
Court of Arkansas on certiorari to review the lower court's judg-
ment adjudging petitioner guilty of contempt of court.
Omitting all the points decided except what we deem the most
important one, and the one upon which the decision in this case
201
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turned, viz.: Whether or not a suit against state officers is a
suit against the state, and therefore prohibited by the Eleventh
Amendment to the Federal Constitution, unless the state gives its
consent, we quote from the opinion of Mr. Justice Lamar in
Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 14o U. S. i: "It is well settled that
no action can be maintained in any Federal Court by citizens of
one of the states against a state, without its consent, even though
the sole object of such suit be to bring the state within the opera-
tion of the constitutional provision which provides that no state
shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts. This
immunity of suit is absolute and ufiqualified, and the constitu-
tional provision securing it is not to be so construed as to place
the state within the reach of the process of the court. Accord-
ingly, it is equally well settled that a suit against the officers of a
state to compel them to do the acts which constitute a perfor-
mance by it of its contracts, is, in effect, a suit against the state
itself." The cases on the subject divide themselves into two
respective classes, viz.:
I. Where a suit is brought against the officers of the state, as
representing the state's action and liability, thus making it,
though not a party to the record, the real party against which the
judgment will so operate as to compel it to specifically perform
its contracts. In re Ayres, 123 U. S., 443; Louisiana v. Jumel,
107 U. S., 711; Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U. S., 769; Hagood v.
Southern, 117 U. S., 52.
2. A suit brought to recover money or property in the hands
of defendants unlawfully taken by them in behalf of the state, or
for compensation in damages, or, in a proper case, where the
remedy at law is inadequate, for an injunction to prevent such
wrong and injury, or for a mandamus, in a like case, to enforce
upon the defendant the performance of a plain legal duty, purely
ministerial, is not within, the meaning of the Eleventh Amend-
ment of the Constitution, an action against the state. Osborn v.
Bank of U. S., 22 U. S., 738; Davis v. Gray, 83 U. S., 203; Allen
v. B. & 0. Ry. Co., 114 U. S., 311; La. Board of Liquidation v.
McComb, 92 U. S., 531 ; Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S., 270.
In the case of In re Ayres, supra, Mr. Justice Matthews says:
"A bill, the object of which is by injunction, indirectly to compel
the specific performance of the contract, by forbidding all those
acts and doings which constitute breaches of the contract, must
202
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also neessarily, be a suit against the state. In such a case, though
the state be not nominally a party on the record, if the defendants
are its officers and agents, through whom alone it can act in doing
and refusing to do the things which constitute a breach of its
contract, the suit is still, in substance, though not in form, a suit
against the state. Also, where the contract is between the indi-
vidual and the state; and any action founded upon it against de-
fendants, who are officers of the state, the object of which is to
enforce its specific performance by compelling those things to be
done by the defendants which, when done, would constitute a
performance by the state, or to forbid the doing of those things
which, if done, would be merely breaches of the contract by the
state, is, in substance, a suit against the state itself, and equally
within the prohibition of the Constitution."
Pomeroy, in his work on Equitable Jurisprudence, Vol. IV,
Sec. 1341, says: "As a general proposition wherever the con-
tract is one of a class which will be affirmatively specifically en-
forced, a court of equity will restrain its breach by injunction, if
this is the only practical mode of enforcement which its terms
permit."
In the cases of La. V. Jumel, Antoni v. Greenhow and Hagood
vi. Southern, supra, practically the same expression is given to
the principle. Hagood v. Southern was a suit against the Comp-
troller General and certain treasurers, but the state was given
leave to come in as defendant if it so desired; still it was held
that the state was the real defendant. In the case of N. H. v.
La., io8 U. S. 76, and N. Y. v. La., IO8 U. S. 76, there was upon
the face of the record nominally a controversy between the states
which, according to the terms of the Constitution, was subject to
the judicial power of the United States.
On examination of the cases as stated in the pleadings, it ap-
peared that the state, in each case, which was plaintiff, was
suing, not for its own use and interest, but for the use and on
behalf of certain individual citizens thereof who had transferred
their claims to the state for the purposes of suit. And it was ac-
cordingly held that the court would look behind and through the
nominal parties on the record to ascertain who were the real
parties to the suit.
Of the second class of cases, the strongest and the one referred
to the most, is that of Osborn v. Bank of U. S., supra, in the
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opinion of which Chief Justice Marshall stated that, "in all cases
where jurisdiction depends on the party, it is the party named in
the record," and that "the Eleventh Amendment is limited to
those suits in which a state is a party to the record."
Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, supra, held, that where a statute
declared void and of no effect all contracts made under a former
valid statute and state commissioners were held for acts done
under the latter statute, they cannot say that the suit is one against
the state within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment, and this
holding is cited by many cases in Class 2 to support their view.
This holding is untenable, as will be seen on examination of that
case, for this, with the majority of cases, holds merely that "a
state officer will be restrained from executing an unconstitu-
tional statute of the state when to execute it would violate rights
and privileges of the complainant which had been guaranteed by
the Constitution, and would work irreparable damage and injury
to him." This same proposition is established in Osborn v. Bank
of U. S., supra. Practically this same principle is the ground for
the issuance of injunctions in the cases of Davis v. Gray, supra;
La. Board of Liquidation v. McComb, supra; Allen v. B. & 0.
Ry., supra, and also for the decision in Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U. S. I.
On reviewing the cases in both classes we find the two lines of
decisions apparently in conflict but with the exception of the
different views taken by the courts as to the parties on the record
being the parties in interest, they do not disaffirm the same
propositions.
Quoting from. the Supreme Court of the United States, in the
case of Poindexter v. Greenhow, supra: "A defendant sued as a
wrongdoer who seeks to substitute the state in his place, or to
justify by authority of the state, or to defend on the ground that
the state has adopted his act and exonerated him, cannot rest on
the bare assertion of his defense, but is bound to establish it; and.
as a state is a political body, which can act only through agents
and command only by laws, in order to complete his defense, he
must produce a valid law of the state which constitutes his com-
mission, as its agent and a warrant for his act." We agree with
the rule as laid down in the opinion given by Mr, Justice Lamar
above quoted, and think, too, that this is the majority rule.
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The statement of Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn v. Bank of
U. S., supra, has been qualified, and now it is a settled doctrine of
the United States Court that the question whether a suit is within
the Eleventh Amendment is not always determined by reference
to the nominal parties on the record, as the court will look behind
and through same to ascertain who are the real parties to the
suit.
It is established also that actions against officers of the United
States are actions against the United States. Minn. v. Hitchcock,
185 U. S. 373; Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. io, and in a re-
cent case, Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 214 U. S. I5I. The
only distinction found in these cases is that where a suit
is against an officer to prevent him from doing an unlawful act
to the injury of the complaining party, such as the taking of or
trespass upon property belonging to the latter, the former cannot
shield himself behind the fact that he is an officer of the state;
and also where the officer refuses to perform a purely ministerial
act, the doing of which is imposed upon him by statute. In
either of such cases, a suit against such an officer is not a suit
against the state.
The conclusion is: That a suit to restrain a state board from
violating a contract is a suit against the state, within the prohi-
bition of the Constitution.
